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CIVIL PROCEDURE
ROBERT W. PETERSONt
I. INTRODUCTION
Over 230 cases decided during the Survey period involved some
civil procedure issue; of these, as might be expected, very few
involved issues of great pith or moment. The fact that many cases
included procedural issues but few turned on them is probably a fair
measure of two things. It might be generalized that Michigan
procedure is doing a fair job, since a procedural system is probably
functioning very well when most cases turn on the merits and not
on procedural points. On the other hand, the number of procedural
points urged on appeal indicates that, while lawyers may be liberal
when it comes to procedural reform, still the ghost of Baron Parke'
guides them when it comes to actual litigation. The temptation to
try to win a case on the pettifogging or the technical is strong, and,
as evidenced by the number of procedural points in the advance
sheets, it must be that winning a case on such a point is still
considered a triumph of the lawyer's art.- The plethora of cases
dictates the exercise of a high degree of discretion in choosing those
to be reviewed. In doing so those that seemed of lasting or general
interest or ones which suggested possible reform have been chosen.
t Associate Professor of Law. Wayne State University. B.A. 1963. San Diego State
College; LL.B. 1966. Stanford University. E.
I. Baron Parke was so imbued with the mysticism of technical pleading requirements
that when liberalized reforms were introduced he resigned from the bench. See Haenlein v.
Saginaw Bldg. Trades Council. AFL. 361 Mich. 263. 275. 105 N.W.2d 166, 175 (1960)
(Smith. J.. dissenting).
2. The point was made quite well by Sergeant Haye's dialogue. Crogaiea ('ase: .4
Dialogue in e Shades on Special Pleading Relora. in 9 W. Hoi.I)sORT11. A HISTORN 0!-
|ENGLISH L.%w app. at 427 (3d ed. 1944) where a conversation between Crogate and Baron
Surrebutter (no doubt the Baron Parke of note I supra) proceeds as follows:
SL R B. Done away with special pleading? Heaven forbid . . .. [W]e framed a series
of rules on the subject, which have given a truly magnificient development to this
admirable system; so much so. indeed, that nearly half the cases coming recently before
the Court. have been decided upon points of pleading.
CROGAT-. You astonish me. But pray how do the suitors like this sort of justice?
SUR. B. Mr. Crogate. that consideration has never occurred to me. nor do I conceive
that laws ought to be adopted to suit the tastes and capacities of the ignorant.
See Haenlein v. Saginaw Bldg. Trades Council, AFL, 361 Mich. 263. 275. 105 N.W.2d 166,
175 (1960) (Smith. J., dissenting).
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II. JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
General Research, Inc. v. A inerican Employer's Insurance Co3
was a diversity action against seven insurance companies arising out
of a single interruption of business (the Grand Rapids riots). The
claims against four of the companies satisfied the $10,000
jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), but the
claims against the other three were under the limit. On motion to
dismiss made by the latter three defendants, Judge Fox ruled that
even though it may not be supported by a great weight of authority
such aggregation of claims should be permitted.
The decision makes good sense, although the weight of
authority is probably to the contrary! Unlike the situation where
none of the individual claims satisfies the $10,000 requirement but
their aggregate does, in General Research a suit could be maintained
in federal court on four of the claims regardless of aggregation.
Dismissal of the three smaller claims would only encourage needless
dual litigation of claims so factually and legally related that they
should be litigated in one action. The concept of ancillary
jurisdiction provides a convenient doctrinal foundation upon which
to base jurisdiction in this situation.4
While there is little doubt as to the practicality of the General
Research decision, the United States Supreme Court eschewed good
sense, cast considerable doubt on Judge Fox's conclusion, and struck
a blow against procedural reform in Snyder v. Harris,5 a case
decided subsequent to General Research. In Snyder the Supreme
Court ruled that even after the 1966 amendments, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 (FRCP) requires that at least one named
claimant in a class action must claim damages in excess of $10,000
if the individual claims should be catagorized as separate and
distinct rather than joint or common. One of the reasons for the
1966 amendment of rule 23 was that the concepts of "separate,"
"distinct," "joint," or "common" under the old class action
practice often-eluded definition.' After Snyder, these discarded
concepts will still govern class actions where the jurisdictional
amount is not met by at least one litigant, even though the amount
3. 289 F. Supp. 735 (1968).
4. C. WRIGHT. FEDERAL COURTS § 36 (2d ed. 1970).
4.1. Id. at 123-24.
5. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note. 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966).
[Vol. 16
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of the judgment (and even the attorney's fee awarded to a successful
plaintiff's attorney) may border on a vast and fabulous sum. The
Court's opinion might have been based in part on a reluctance to
expand diversity jurisdiction. Unfortunately, limiting diversity
jurisdiction by interpreting the "amount in controversy" rubric
narrowly also serves to restrict federal resolution of federal question
litigation where the only basis of jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
which also contains a $10,000 limitation. This case no doubt came
as a blow to those who anticipated use of rule 23 as an effective
device for consumer protection in situations where state class action
rules are less effective.7 There appears to be little reason for so
restrictive an approach, especially in the class action setting, but
after Snyder any relief will have to come from Congress
The doubt which Snyder casts on the General Research decision
is not so much a product of any direct holding in Snyder as a
product of some reasonable inferences from that opinion. The two
dissenters capsulized the deleterious effect of Snyder as follows:
Litigants, lawyers, and federal courts must now continue to be
ensnared in their complexitites [the distinctions .between "joint",
"common", and "several"] in all cases where one or more of the
coplaintiffs has a claim of less than the jurisdictional amount. . .
Their reading is supported by citations in the majority opinion to
two cases holding that where the rights are several all claimants
must satisfy the $10,000 amount. 0 Any such holding would be
unfortunate and would run contrary to the philosophy of ancillary
and pendant jurisdiction recently approved by the Supreme Court.,,
7. See, e.g., Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit
Legislation, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 80, 110-11, 114 (1969).
8. Professor Wright urges Congressional overturning of Snyder in C. WRIGHT. supra
note 4. at 316, and a bill has been introduced to do so for the consumer class action. See the
remarks of Senator Tydings upon introducing the Class Action Jurisdiction Bill in 115 CONG.
REC. 4163 (Apr. 25, 1969). A reprint of the bill can be found in Id. at 4164.
9. 394 U.S. at 343 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
10. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), was cited with apparent approval
and Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
827 (1967) (decided under present Rule 23) was cited at least without disapproval.
II. In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the Court said:
Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies
are strongly encouraged . ...
Pendant jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim
'arising under [the] Constitution. the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
19701
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III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A number of significant cases decided during the Survey period
affected the statute of limitations, many of which seem to reach
divergent results. Cases of interest covered problems of classifying
claims for purposes of determining which statutory period applies,
problems of accrual, problems of adding new parties defendant after
the period has run, and problems of tolling.
In State Mutual Cyclone Insurance Co. v. 0 & A Electric
Cooperative,2 the Michigan Supreme Court held that a cause of
action based on breach of contract to supply proper amounts of
electricity, which resulted in the death of plaintiff's cows,": was
governed by the three-year statute of limitations for damages to
"persons or property,"' 4 rather than the six-year limitation
governing actions to "recover damages or sums due for breach of
contract."'' 5 Fries v. Holland Hitch Co." and Malesev v.
Garavaglia,'7 both court of appeals-cases released for publication
after the State Mutual case, reached conclusions contrary to State
Mutual.
In Fries a trailer hitch broke causing plaintiff's tractor and
trailer to roll into a ditch, and plaintiff sought to recover both for
damages done to the tractor and trailer and incidental damages due
to loss of use. Plaintiffs theory was that the manufacturer breached
an implied warranty of fitness for purpose and that the manufacturer
or which shall be made, under their authority. ... The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard for
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of
the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole ....
Its [pendent jurisdiction's] justification lies in considerations of judicial economy.
convenience and fairness to litigants ....
Id. at 724-26.
12. 381 Mich. 318, 161 N.W.2d 573 (1968) (4 to 3 decision).
13. The case does not relate exactly how the cows met their end.
14. RJA § 5805(7) (1961).
15. Id. § 5807(8). The court said:
[lit makes no difference what form of action the plaintiff institutes seeking recovery
for damages to property or person, but in all cases such action comes within the 3-
year limitation rule. There is a total absence of any legislative mandate or thought that
we distinguish between actions on express contracts to recover damages for injury to
person or property and actions based upon implied contract. . ..
381 Mich. at 324-25, 161 N.W.2d at 576.
16. 12 Mich. App. 178, 162 N.W.2d 672 (1968).
17. 12 Mich. App. 282, 162 N.W.2d 844 (1968).
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knew or should have known of the defect. The court, even though it
cited State Mutual, held that the three-year limitation period
applied because there was "'no express contractual provision."" In
Malesev plaintiffs originally sued to recover damages done to their
land on account of blasting by the defendant. When this action was
dismissed because commenced more than three years after the cause
of action accrued, plaintiffs commenced another action claiming
recovery as third party beneficiaries of a contract (apparently of
indemnification) between the road commission and the construction
firms doing the blasting. The court held that in such a case the six-
year statute of limitations would apply, since the cause of action
would be based on breach of an express contract. 9
It is apparent that the reasoning in Fries and the result in
Malesev are inconsistent with the supreme court's opinion in State
Mutual. The genesis of the confusion is an inherent ambiguity
injected into the statute by the Revised Judicature Act of 1961
(RJA). Prior to 1961 the statute of limitations provided a basic six-
year limitation for all actions, followed by a proviso clause limiting
actions for damages to person, property, or land to three years.20 No
mention was made of actions based on contract: Under such a
statutory scheme it is clear that the applicable period turned on the
nature of the injury rather than the theory of the plaintiff.2' The RJA
of 1961 altered that scheme by placing the three- and six-year
periods in separate sections and providing a special section dealing
with actions on contracts. The relevant portions of the two sections
now read:
The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover
18.
We believe that the correct construction of these statutory provisions to be that
where the injury is to specific property of persons, the 3-year limitation controls. The
6-year period may be thought of as an exception applicable to such actions wherein
the injury is occasioned by breach of some express contractual provision. [Cases cited].
On the other hand, in contracts of a commercial nature or where the-breach injures
one in his financial expectations and economic benefit rather than his person or specific
property, then such actions may be brought within 6 years whether found upon express
or implied contract.
12 Mich. App. at 185. 162 N.W.2d at 676.
19. Unlike the Fries case, the Malesev court only cited the subsequently reversed court
of appeals opinion in State Mutual even though the Malesev opinion was released for
publication after the supreme court's opinion.
20. No. 21. [19511 Mich. Pub. Acts 24-25.
21. Baatz v. Smith. 361 Mich. 68, 104 N.W.2d 787 (1960); Coates v. Milner Hotels,
Inc.. 311 Mich. 233. 18 N.W.2d 389 (1945).
1970]
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damage for injuries to persons and property. RJA § 5805(7).
The period of limitations is 6 years for all other actions to recover
damages or sums due for breach of contract. RJA § 5807(8).
Since "damages . . . for breach of contract" in many cases can
include "damages . . . to persons and property," in order to
reconcile these two sections either RJA 5805 must be read as
qualifying RJA 5807, leaving the six-year limitation to govern
economic harm, such as loss of bargain and failure to pay amounts
due under a contract 2 or the applicable period must turn on the
theory of the pleader, leaving all contract actions governed by
section 5807 and all other actions for damages to persons or
property governed by section 5805.
The Committee Comments support the latter approach since
they refer to RJA 5805 as "a compilation of the limitations on the
general tort remedies ' ' 23 and RJA 5807 as "the periods of
limitations relating to contract remedies."'" This scheme also is used
within the body of the two sections to draw distinctions between the
kinds of cases to which shorter or longer statutes of limitations
apply. Thus, an assault and battery cause of action must be brought
within two years, whereas a negligence action can be brought within
three; but if filed after two years cannot be dismissed because the
conduct might also amount to an assault and battery. "In
determining whether the statute has run on plaintiff's cause of action
he is entitled to the benefit of the allegations of a cause of action, if
any, against which the statute has not run. 25 Likewise, for purposes
of accrual, "actions for damages based on breach of warranty of
quality or fitness" accrue when the breach was or should have
reasonably been discovered 6 even though, presumably, the same
claim based on negligence might have accrued differently.27
The court in State Mutual did its best with an inconsistent
statute and probably aligned itself with the majority of courts which
22.- See Frenzel v. City of Muskegon, - Mich. App. -, 174 N.W.2d 145 (1970)
(under State Mutual six-year period governed third-party action by city against lessee on
"save and hold harmless" clause although city was originally held liable for damages to "per-
son or property"). The Fries court added a third possibility; see note 18 supra. A distinction
between "express" and "implied" contracts is, however, nowhere found in the statute.
23. RJA § 5805, Committee Note at 822 (1961).
24. Id. § 5807, Committee Note at 835.
25. Striker v. Martindale, 372 Mich. 578, 581, 127 N.W.2d 306, 307 (1964).
26. RJA § 5833 (1961).
27. Id. § 5827.
[Vol. 16
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have faced the same kind of problem.'8 It is questionable whether the
policies fostered by a statute of limitations are best served by the
distinctions presently drawn. If, for instance, the defendant refused
to deliver a cow, an action to recover loss of profits during the
period necessary for the plaintiff to purchase another cow would be
governed, presumably, by the six-year period. Yet, if the defendant
breached a contract to deliver proper quantities of electricity and
killed plaintiffs cow, plaintiff could neither recover for the cow nor
for the loss of profits pending purchase of another if suit is brought
after three years. The defendant's interest in repose is not stronger
in one case than the other; the reflection on the validity of plaintiff's
claim due to dilatory commencement is no worse; and the proof,
other than the body of the cow, is not staler.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive why any claim should be
permitted after six years, particularly when, if it comes to trial in a
metropolitan area, court delay could age it by over another three
years. No matter how well preserved, a nine-year old claim is bound
to be stale. A uniform period for all claims would do much to
eliminate confusion and promote the defendant's legimate interest in
being "secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been
wiped clean of ancient obligations. 29 The present four-year period
in the Uniform Commercial Code 0 would be the likely candidate,
since any other period might frustrate the policy of uniformity
furthered by the Code.3  Special periods shorter than four years
could be adopted for actions in which the evidence is unusually
transient or the action is one unpopular in the law?2 For claims
where the wrong is difficult to discover but upon discovery the
evidence is unusually reliable, the harshness of the rule could be
28. See cases collected in 34 Ai. JUR. Limitations of Actions §§ 103. 104 (1941). 53
C.J.S. Linitations ofActions §§ 73, 74 (1968).
29. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1930).
30, NMicH. Co\ip. LAWS ANN. § 440.2725, official U.C.C. Comment at 810 (1967).
This period seems long. but it was selected because 'within the normal commercial record
keeping period."
31. This policy might be frustrated by the present six-year limitation on contract
damage claims. However, since the UCC was enacted after the RJA of 1961, the UCC
limitation period would probably cover any contract action which fell within the ambit of the
UCC.
32. Libel and slander and assault and battery would qualify for this.
19701
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ameloriated by an accrual upon discovery provision. Then perhaps
an outside limit on undiscovered causes of action should be set.-,
If. the applicable period is unclear, Michigan law as to when a
cause of action accrues is hardly more clear. In Duncan v. BereS3
the court of appeals held that the statute does not begin to run
against a claim for contribution until the amount is paid; however,
the Michigan Supreme Court held in Morgan v. McDermott:' that
a claim for contribution against a county for failure to maintain a
safe road was cut off after sixty days if within that time the county
was not properly notified of the accident. Where the statute of
limitations is the same as to both defendants, abusive delay on the
part of one defendant in impleading the other can be checked by
refusing to allow the impleader under the Michigan General Court
Rule 204 (GCR) .37 Where the periods are different because of the
character of the parties, the plaintiff by delaying the filing of suit
could, under Morgan, cut off the defendant from his right to
contribution which would have existed had the suit been brought in
time for the third party complaint to have been filed. This ability
33. This was the rationale that led the New York Court of Appeals to adopt, by a
questionable technique of statuatory interpretation, an accrual upon discovery approach for
malpractice cases involving foreign objects left in the patient's body. Approximately nine other
jurisdictions have a rule limited to foreign object cases. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen.
Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427. 432, 248 N.E.2d 871, 875. 301 N.Y.S.2d 23,27 (1069).
34. Such a proposition passed both houses in the New York legislature, but at different
times. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp.. 24 N.Y.2d 427. 432, 248 N.E.2d 871, 875.
301 N.Y.S. 2d 23, 27 (1969).
In Winfrey v. Farhat, 382 Mich. 380, 170 N.W.2d 34 (1969). the Michigan Supreme
Court allowed a malpractice suit against a physician even though the operation was performed
in 1949 and the malpractice was not discovered until 1965. Since RJA § 5838 provides that
a malpractice cause of action accrues when the defendant discontinues treating or otherwise
serving the plaintiff as to matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, the tWinlre
case is only applicable to causes of action which accrued prior to January 1. 1963 (the effective
date of the RJA). Accrual upon termination of treatment was the rule in Michigan up to
the time the RJA became effective: indeed, the Committee Comments make it clear that RJA
§ 5838 was merely a codification of DeHaan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932).
Without even citing the RJA. the Michigan Supreme Court overruled DeHaan in Johnson v.
Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368. 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963). a case handed down after RJA went into
effect but relating to a cause of action which accrued prior to the effective date of the RJA
Johnson is a rare case of pure retrospective overruling since it can affect only causes of action
in existence prior to January I. 1963.
35. 15 Mich. App. 318. 166 N.W.2d 678 (1968).
36. 382 Mich. 333, 169 N.W.2d 897 (1969). This case is actually more recent than the
Survey period, but is mentioned here because it relates to the problem in Duncan.
37. Unless otherwise noted, reference to GCR will be to the 1963 promulgation.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Wayne L. Rev. 508 1969-1970
CIVIL PROCEDURE
of the plaintiff to select which of several wrongdoers is to bear the
full onus of judgment was precisely the kind of unequal justice that
the contribution between joint tort-feasors section of RJA 3 8 and the
impleader provisions of GCR 204.1 were designed to eliminate.
Another serious ambiguity in the Michigan statute of
limitations is in its general accrual provision, RJA 5827, which
states that unless otherwise expressly provided a "claim accrues at
the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done
regardless of the time when damage results. ' 3 The language is
somewhat similar to that in a Connecticut statute0 which was
interpreted to mean the cause of action accrued when an object was
manufactured and sold, not when it caused injury. Under the
Connecticut statute the cause of action might be barred before there
is any injury if, as might happen in a products liability case, the
product is marketed more than three years before the injury. Since
the Michigan statute is not as clear as those in other states, it is an
invitation to litigation. At least two lower courts in Michigan have
held that a cause of action does not accrue until the injury-even as
to a machine manufactured in 1923.11 Both courts placed much
reliance on Coury v. General Motors Corp.,42 where the court held
that a cause of action for wrongful death did not accrue until the
38. RJA § 2925 (1961).
39. d. § 5827.
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1958):
No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal
property, caused by negligence ... shall be brought but within one year from the date
when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than
three years from ihe date of the act or omission complained of... [emphasis added].
In addition, where a personal injury action is based on breach of warranty, the applicable
statute of limitations in Connecticut is the one governing tort actions rather than that
governing contract actions. Rempe v. General Elec. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577
(Super Ct. 1969).
North Carolina has reached much the same result, but based the result on their judicial
interpretation of "wrong" rather than on statutory language as specific as that in the
Connecticut statute. Land v. Neill Pontiac, Inc., 6 N.C. App. 197, 169 S.E.2d 537 (1969)
(cause of action for negligent manufacture of auto accrued at the time of sale rather than at
time when gas tank fell from car causing buyer injury). The interesting question would be
whether the Land case would apply the same accrual date to an injured bystander.
41. Gambrell v. Dreis & Drump Mfg. Co., Civil No. 32247 (E.D. Mich., April 25, 1969)
(machine manufactured in 1952. suit filed for 1966 injury in 1969); Hoeppner v. E.W. Bliss
Co.. Civil No. 106316. (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., Dec. 26, 1968) (machine
manufactured in 1923. injury in 1965).
42. 376 Mich. 248, 137 N.W.2d 134 (1965).
1970]
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decedent's demise, even though the injuries happened long before.
The Coury case is scant authority for interpreting the present statute
because, although decided in 1965, the action involved was filed
before the RJA of 1961 went into effect, and prior thereto the statute
contained no provision similar to RJA 5827. The courts' results are
bolstered both by the large majority of jurisdictions which require
some injury before a cause of action acrues4: and by the wording of
RJA 5827 which provides that the period commences to run after
the claim first accrued to claimant or someone through whom he
claims. Since the claimant for negligent manufacture is not identified
until some injury occurs to him, it would not be possible to satisfy
section 5827 prior to injury.
In any event, a ruling that the statute had run would not result
in dismissal of most of these cases since they usually include a cause
of action based on breach of warranty, and RJA 5833 expressly
provides that such claims do not accrue until "the breach of
warranty is discovered or reasonably should be discovered." The
section leaves unanswered the question who should discover the
defect-the purchaser or the operator of the machine-but, since
much the same evidence will be introduced to support both
negligence and breach of warranty claims, there is little reason to bar
one and nbt the other.
There is something to be said for a manufacturer who, after
forty-six years, is called upon to defend a claim that a machine was
either defective or negligently manufactured. The evidence on
liability will be very stale and many material witnesses will, no
doubt, have expired. While it might be justifiable to hold a
manufacturer liable for the useful life of the product, since it is on
the useful life that the products value is based, such a limitation is
exceptionally vague and probably unworkable. The most reasonable
solution might be to adopt an outside limit on all actions
commenced after a specified period from the date the product is
injected into the stream of commerce.
Two cases decided during the Survey period reached opposite
conclusions on the question whether a plaintiff may add a defendant
after the statute of limitations has run where the plaintiff erred in
suing the wrong defendant and the proper defendant had knowledge
within the period that a suit had been filed. In Bebsinger v. Reid"
43. See Annot. 4 A.L.R.3d 821, 830 (1965).
44. 17 Mich. App. 219, 169 N.W.2d 361 (1969).
[Vol. 16
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the plaintiff originally served and sued Reid, the owner of the truck
involved in a collision. After the period had run the court allowed
the plaintiff to add as a defendant, Happyland Shows, Inc., 6f which
Reid was resident agent, stockholder, an incorporator, and
president. In Apple v. Solomon,45 the plaintiff originally served
Straith Clinic and after the period had run was not allowed to add
Straith Memorial Hospital, Inc., a legally separate entity sharing the
same premises. Both cases attempted to apply Wells v. Detroit News
Inc.,"6 the leading case in Michigan on the question. The primary
difference between the Bebsinger and the Apple cases is that in the
former the person actually served could have accepted service for the
corporation while in the latter the agent of Straith Clinic could not
have accepted service for Straith Memorial Hospital, Inc. Although
in both cases it was assumed the proper defendant had actual notice
of the suit, another significant difference is that in Bebsinger Reid
answered admitting ownership of the car, thus tending to mislead the
plaintiff, while in Apple the answer was not misleading and the
plaintiff waited fifteen months to raise the objection. The Wells case,
however, allowed the new party to be added after plaintiff's
"protracted slumber" of eighteen months,47 so the critical fact, and
the one present in Bebsinger and Wells, was probably that the party
served could have accepted service for the proper party had the
summons and complaint designated the proper party. 7 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) expressly allows a party
to be added when the party knew or should have known that but for
a mistake concerning identity he would have been sued, and the
party had such notice of the action that he would not be prejudiced
in maintaining his defense. The federal rule does not require as a
prerequisite that a proper party be served by the wrong name. It
would seem that, if service of summons and complaint results in
such a defendant being fully informed, the policy of the statute of
limitations would be adequately fulfilled. Service on a person
otherwise qualified to accept service for the intended defendant
45. 12 Mich. App. 393, 163 N.W.2d 20 (1968).
46. 360 Mich. 634, 104 N.W.2d 767 (1960).
47. Id. at 643, 104 N.W.2d at 771 (Black, J., dissenting).
47.1 The best that can be said with respect to a general rule in other jurisdictions is
that courts have taken firm stands on all sides of the issue. See the analysis in Martz v. Miller
Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965) (decided before but discussing the 1966 amendment
to FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)).
19701
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should only be a factor to be taken into account in determining
actual notice. Perhaps an amendment to GCR 118 along these lines
should be considered.
IV. DISCOVERY
In the case of Dowood Co. v. Michigan Tool Co.," the court
of appeals moved another step in the direction of the line of cases"5
which has substantially undercut the admissibility limitation on the
scope of discovery found in GCR 302.2. Plaintiff was suing for
damages done by a fire allegedly caused by defendant's product.
Plaintiff deposed an employee of the defendant and asked him for
information about any fires occuring both prior and subsequent to
plaintiff's fire that might have involved defendant's product. Defense
counsel objected on the ground that the evidence was inadmissible
unless the subsequent fires happened under conditions substantially
similar to the conditions surrounding plaintiff's fire, and no such
foundation for the question had been laid. The court ordered the
questions answered, noting that to require such a foundation at a
discovery deposition would be like the bank of Will Rogers' day,
which was "a place where a man can borrow some money if he can
prove he doesn't need to." ''
Although the Michigan rule differs from the more broadly
worded federal rule 5' the approach taken towards the admissibility
requirement by the Michigan courts has substantially reduced the
shield that the requirement was supposed to provide against "fishing
expeditions." In 1966 the supreme court repealed the admissibility
requirement with respect to discovery of documents under GCR 310,
and the very liberal approach to the admissibility requirement has
left it somewhat moribund.5 2 Such being the case, query whether the
continued existence of the admissibility requirement is worth its
48. 14 Mich. App. 158. 165 N.W.2d 450 (1968).
49. Wilson v. Saginaw Cir. Judge, 370 Mich. 404, 122 N.W.2d 57 (1963); LaCroix v.
Grand Trunk W.R.R., 368 Mich. 321, 118 N.W.2d 302 (1962); Kalamazoo Yellow Cab Co. v.
Kalamazoo Cir. Judge, 363 Mich. 384, 109 N.W.2d 821 (1961).
50. 14 Mich. App. at 163 n.5, 165 N.W.2d at 453 n.5.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) provides in part: -'[Tlhe deponent may be examined regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action . . . . It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial
if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."
52. See authorities cited note 49 supra.
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nuisance potential as a bone of contention at depositions and in
interrogatories. Since the scope of inquiry is approaching so nearly
the federal one and appellate review of discovery questions is difficult
and rare,:' is there any valid reason not to adopt the federal standard
and get as a bonus the vast wealth of existing authority on federal
discovery problems? 3-1
In contrast to the liberal approach taken to the General Court
Rules, the new District Court Rules (DCR) have the potential of
being very restrictive on discovery. DCR 302 provides that no
discovery is available in the district courts without court order. If
recovery is sought for damages to person or property, pretrial
examination or inspection "may" be ordered, but depositions may
be taken only for use as testimony and upon order of the court after
a showing of good cause. This rule is probably a reaction against a
tendency of attorneys to discover a case to death, a practice inimical
to the purposes for establishing courts with a $3,000 jurisdictional
limit. Nevertheless, the limitations on discovery will no doubt lead
to more attacks on pleadings by way of motions to strike, motions
for more definite statement, and motions for summary judgment.4
Hopefully the limitations on discovery will in the long run prove
more efficient and will not lead back to relying solely on artful
pleading to define and limit the scope of law suits. It is interesting
to note that this restrictive discovery rule also runs contrary to the
trend in Detroit Common Pleas Court, which in 1967 adopted the
circuit court discovery rules for all actions in which more than
$1,000 damages are claimed. 5
53. Shuchman, Discovering the Law of Discovery by Low Level Investigations. 38 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 32 (1969). The interlocutory appeal was granted in the Dowood case only
because the court thought the case "'presented an issue of major significance to the
jurisprudence of this State. GCR 1963, 806.3(l) (a)(ii).'" 14 Mich. App. at 160, 165 N.W.2d
at 451-52.
53.L. It would. however. be a mistake to infer that the federal decisions are all uniform.
The Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211 (1967), will. if
adopted, resolve many conflicts. For the most part, where there are conflicting decisions the
proposed rules opt for the position permitting broader discovery.
54. The "leave it to discovery" approach taken toward objections to specificity in
pleadings by another case during the Survey period, Major v. Schmidt Trucking Co., 15 Mich.
App. 75, 166 NW.2d 517 (1968). would not be satisfactory in the district court.
55. DET. C.P. CT. R. 22. 24. 25 in HONIGMAN & HAWKINS. MICH. CT. R. MANNUAL
591-92 (1969); see Publishers Agency, Inc., v. Brooks. 14 Mich. App. 634, 166 N.W.2d 26
(1968).
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The question of whether insurance policy limits are discoverable
is one much mooted. In GCR 301.1(6) the Michigan Supreme Court
resolved that they should not be discoverable unless "relevant to an
issue in the case and admissible in evidence." The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not expressly speak on the discoverability of
insurance limits, and applying the general standard for discovery
under rule 26 federal courts have reached differing conclusions s In
Cuellar v. Hamer,57 Judge Fox held that in all future cases coming
before him policy limits would be discoverable. Judge Fox noted that
an amendment had been proposed to rule 26 which would permit
such discovery and then summarized the reasons given why
disclosure of insurance coverage should be distinguished from
disclosure of general financial status; (1) insurance is an asset
created specifically to satisfy the claim, (2) the insurance company
ordinarily controls the litigation, (3) the information about coverage
is available only from defendant or his insurer, and (4) disclosure
does not involve a significant invasion of privacy. The first reason
would seem to be irrelevant; the second equally true for a private,
uninsured individual; and the third equally true with respect to an
individual's bank account unless he has disclosed its contents to a
credit agency. The fourth reason is probably the best reason to
distinguish this discovery from attempts to pry into the assets of an
uninsured individual.
Perhaps more interesting than the rule is the procedural device
used by Judge Fox to implement the proposed but unadopted federal
rule. He found that "[rlule 26(b) does not specifically authorize
discovery of insurance limits. But neither does that rule specifically
prohibit such discovery." Federal rule 83 provides "[i]n all cases not
provided for by rule [FRCP or local court rule], the district courts
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules." Since the matter was not covered by the FRCP or by local
56. The following authorities support discoverability: Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875
(D.D.C. 1966) (cases cited); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Thode, Some
Reflections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Pertaining to
Witnesses at Trial, Depositions, and Discoveries, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 33, 40-42 (1958);
Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Automobile Tort Cases, 10 ALA.
L. REV. 355 (1958). The following argue against discoverability: Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F.
Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Fournier, Pre-
Trial Discovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 215 (1959); Frank,
Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 INs. L.J. 281.
57. 45 F.R.D. 245 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
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rule, Judge Fox held a federal judge was authorized under this
provision to promulgate rules of practice in his court. The difficulty
lies in resolving when a federal rule would be inconsistent with a
judge's proposed rule. Rule 26 does not expressly state that only
matters which fall within its ambit may be discovered, yet such a
limitation may very well have been the intent of the draftsmen.
Where a rule of the FRCP deals only with a matter of housekeeping
and orderly dispatch of judicial business, a district judge should feel
free to conclude that one of his rules supplementing an existing rule
is not inconsistent with it, but where a rule evidences a very broad
policy and has been the product of considerable study, the more
logical conclusion is that the draftsmen intended to go as far as they
did and no further. Since rule 26(b) is of the latter variety, a local
rule granting more discovery exceeds the ambit of rule 26 and should
be considered in conflict therewith.58
Although it denied doing so, the court of appeals in Chapman
v. Buder,59 expanded on the leading Michigan case, Ruhala v.
Roby," on use of depositions at trial. The Chapman court held that
a deposition of a co-defendant could be used as substantive evidence
against the other defendant," citing the language in GCR 302.4(2)
that a deposition of a party "may be used by an adverse party for
any purpose." Since the issue was not presented, the Ruhala case
did not reach it, but did hold that a prior inconsistent statement of
a party could not be used as substantive evidence against a co-party
even if in the deposition the declarant admits making the statement.
58. In Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the Court held that although FRCP
41(b) did not by its terms provide for sua sponte dismissal of a case for failure to attend a
pretrial conference, still the court had inherent power to do so. The Court then in a footnote
pointed out that the dismissal might be looked on as a local rule and, if so, it was not
inconsistent with the FRCP. Id. at 633 n.8. A similar and as yet unresolved question is
whether local rules providing for impartial medical experts are in conflict with FRCP 35. C.
WRIGHT. FEDERAL COURTS 392 (2d ed. 1970).
In Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968), a local rule limiting the number of
pro hac vice appearances an out of state attorney could make was struck down as
unnecessarily restrictive of a litigant's choice of counsel in civil rights cases. The method of
review was by writ of mandamus brought by the excluded attorneys.
59. 14 Mich. App. 13, 165 N.W.2d 436 (1968).
60. 379 Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967); see Hoppe, Evidence, 1967 Ann. Survey of
Mich. Law, 14 VAYNE L. REV. 149 (1967); Lombard, Civil Procedure, 1967 Ann. Survey of
Mich. Law. 14 WAYNE L. REV. 91 (1967).
61. 5 J. WIGIORE. EVIDENCE § 1416 (3d. ed. 1940).
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The Chapman issue would have been squarely presented in Ruhala
had the deponent adopted the prior inconsistent statement as true.
Unless a deponent were unavailable, the traditional rules of
evidence have never qualified a deposition of a witness for
substantive use, even though the party had an opportunity to cross-
examine at the deposition.- If a party's deposition vis-a-vis a co-
party is to be treated as substantive evidence, there is little reason
for treating the deposition of a witness differently unless it is to
avoid the anomaly of an inconsistent verdict on the same issue. 3 The
mere joinder of a witness as a party makes his deposition statements
no more reliable than if he retained his status as a witness-indeed
his self-interest as a party would probably make them less reliable.
Nevertheless, GCR 302.4(1) allows the use of an available witness'
deposition only "for purpose of impeaching the testimony of
deponent as a witness." In light of the restrictive use of a witness'
deposition, the "any purpose" language of the rule should be
interpreted as merely codifying the admission exception to the
hearsay rule which always allowed use of a prior relevant statement
of a party as substantive evidence against that party, but not against
a co-party. 4 This rule would, of course, be qualified by such
62. This result might follow if the only evidence for a proposition were the deposition
of a co-party. The jury could find the proposition to be true vis-a-vis the deposed party because
the deposition qualifies as an admission, but a directed verdict would have to be granted for
the other defendant since the deposition could not be used against him. This possible result
did not bother the Michigan Supreme Court in Ruhala. It held that prior inconsistent
statements could not be used substantively against the non-declarant defendant even though
the party conceded having made them in a deposition.
63. Indeed, if the deposition of a co-defendant is admissible against a defendant, there
is little reason why it should not be admissible against the plaintiff. It also follows from the
Chapman rule that a defendant should be able to use the deposition of a co-plaintiff against
another joined plaintiff. See Tomita v. Tucker. 18 Mich. App. 599, 171 N.W.2d 564 (1969).
64. See Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102. 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). The only federal case
which research has uncovered on the point interpreted the identical language in FRCP 26(d)(2)
as permitting use of a defendant's deposition against a co-defendant. Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d
53 (10th Cir. 1964).
In Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Payne, 6 Mich. App. 204, 148 N.W.2d 503
(1967), the court of appeals analogized GCR 302.4(2) to the admissions exception, pointing
out that admissions of a party are not admissible as substantive evidence against a co-party.
Since in Genesee the depositions were being offered only against the parties who made the
statements, the comment was not necessary to the decision. The Michigan Supreme Court in
affirming the Genesee case said: "The question dealing with the admission of the depositions
of the defendants, even though they were present in court, was correctly decided by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102. 150 N.W.2d 146
(1967)." 381 Mich. 234, 241, 161 N.W.2d 17, 21 (1968). From this cryptic affirmance, it is
impossible to tell whether the supreme court accepted the court of appeals' comments in toto.
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doctrines as vicarious admissions and statements made by a co-party
in furtherance of a conspiracy.15
V. SEPARATE TRIALS
Applying a rule the United States Supreme Court adopted to
protect the right of confrontation in criminal cases, 6 the Michigan
Court of Appeals in Paratore v. Furst71 held that it was an abuse of
discretion not to order separate, civil trials for a driver and
passenger where both were accused of contributory negligence in a
suit by them against the driver of another car. The reason for the
ruling was that the driver could be impeached with his prior traffic
convictions, whereas the driver's traffic convictions would be
admissible against the passenger only if he knew about them. 8 In
addition, the driver's prior negligent or reckless conduct known to
the passenger would be admissible against the passenger but not
against the driver unless the conduct had resulted in conviction.
Since these distinctions would be too subtle for a jury to draw. the
court held separate trials should have been ordered. The court
expressly did not preclude joint trials where evidence of a past
driving record is ladmissible against both parties although admissible
for different purposes (e.g., against the driver for impeachment and
against the passenger to show negligent entrustment of his safety to
the driver).
One can only conjecture about the mental powers of jurors, yet
it seems clear that, if such situations must result in separate trials
because of the rule that a litigant's credibility can be impeached with
a traffic conviction, then the rule allowing such impeachment should
be scrapped. The policy underlying liberal joinder and the efficiencies
65. Under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, statements made by an agent or
other person authorized by a party to speak concerning a given subject are admissible against
that party. Similarly, statements made by a co-conspirator during the course and furtherance
of a conspiracy are admissible against the other conspirator. These exceptions are discussed
in Comment. Hearsay under tMe Proposed Federal Rules oJ Evidence: .4 Discretionary
Approach. 15 WAYNE L. Ri-.v. 1079, 1098-1101 (1969).
66. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
67. 15 Mich. App. 568, 167 N.W.2d 126 (1969).
68. Evidently it would be possible for a passenger to be negligent in entrusting himself
to a driver with multiple traffic convictions, yet it would not be possible to show that it was
negligent for such a driver to drive with multiple convictions. Certainly this would be a case
of infirm resolve with respect to the relevancey of prior bad acts. In the next to last paragraph
of the decision, the court equivocates on this issue.
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thereby achieved would seem to far outweigh any benefit to the cause
of justice by allowing impeachment with evidence bearing only the
most remote relationship to credibility.69
If the rule allowing impeachment were eliminated, the only
problem left in the Paratore situation, would be whether a jury could
apply a rule admitting evidence of prior bad driving known to the
passenger for the purpose of showing negligent entrustment by the
passenger but not for the purpose of showing negligent driving. This
distinction seems no more subtle or confusing than asking the jury
to limit consideration of evidence admissibile against both parties to
specific purposes-a situation the court apparently would allow.
Consequently, elimination of the impeachment rule should result in
taking full advantage of the benefits of liberal joinder provisions.
VI. INTERVENTION AND CLASS ACTIONS
Three interesting cases involving intervention and class actions
were decided during the Survey period. In Foster v. City of Detroit,0
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed "one way" intervention
after a favorable judgment in a class action prosecuted under FRCP
23(a)(3) prior to its amendment in 1966. The action was brought by
property owners on behalf of all other property owners in a given
area to recover property damages caused by a condemnation
proceeding that had been pending for many years before being
dropped. Although denominated a class action, since it was brought
under old subdivision (a)(3), it would have been "spurious" and,
therefore, binding only on those who were actually named parties.
In many situations allowing such intervention would violate the
traditional requirement of mutuality;7 the unnamed property owners
would not be bound by an adverse judgment, but they could take
advantage of a favorable one. The court said that the instant case
did not fall into that category because, pending the present suit, the
statute of limitations had run on all other property owners' claims.
If through intervention the statute of limitations is in effect tolled
for people actually not parties or bound by the judgment, it is not
69. For a critical discussion of this rule of impeachment, see Quick, Evidence, 1965
Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 140, 147-53 (1965).
70. 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
71. See discussion in text at note 96 infra.
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at all clear whether the filing of such a class action would toll the
statute of limitations so that would-be intervenors could file
independent actions if the spurious class action culminated in. an
unfavorable judgment.72 Although the Michigan class action rule73
remains the same as the pre-1966 federal rule, the federal class
action rule adopted in 1966 has somewhat mooted this question.
Under present rule 23(c)(3), all members of any authorized class
action are included within the judgment, whether favorable or not.7 1
Although the Advisory Committee Comments on the change make
it clear that it was designed to eliminate one-way intervention, 5 it
may be questioned whether the new rule has entirely eliminated that
possibility. If a class action proceeds under rule 23(b)(3), the class
members are entitled to opt out of the action and not be bound.
Having opted out the party may attempt to intervene following a
favorable judgment. Although the rule does notspecifically preclude
such intervention, it clearly would violate the spirit of the new rule
72. In York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), Frank, J., held that filing such an action should toll the statute
of limitations because, quoting from another case, " 'It would be a strange anomaly in the
law, if it should allow an action to be brought for a party, and he should thus be encouraged
to rely upon it, and not seek legal redress otherwise than by it, and yet when he came, in the
course of his action, to prove his debt, and share in the fund, to treat him as having, by such
reliance, lost it by the lapse of time, happening after the bringing of the action.'" Although
the case did involve intervention, the court went on to say: "As the suit comes within' Rule
23 (a)(3), so that a judgment will not be res judicata as to noteholders who do not intervene,
there is no necessity for a searching inquiry concerning the adequacy of her representation of
others in the class." Id. at 528 n.52. It would seem to follow that, if adequacy of
representation is not important, members of the class should be entitled to rely on the filing
of the action to toll the statute of limitations since a requirement that they file separate actions
to protect themselves would undercut the rationale of allowing such actions. Members of the
class also should be permitted to file independant actions within a reasonable time if the first
action is concluded adversely to them. For a good discussion of the policy reasons underlying
tolling or not tolling the statute of limitations in class actions, compare the majority opinion
with the concurrence of Friendly, J., in Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp. 340 F.2d 73 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nona., Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966). See also
Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitations: A Study
of Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REv. 370 (1968).
For the effect of filing a class action under present rule 23, see Wright, supra note 4, at
§ 72; Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 42
(1967).
73. MICn. GEN. CT. R. 208 (1963).
74. The Advisory Committee Comments make it clear, however, that it is always open
for one included within the class to attack an adverse judgment on the basis of inadequacy of
representation. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), Advisory Committee Comment, 39 F.R.D. at 106.
75. Id.
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if someone who had opted out were allowed to intervene. Moreover,
such an attempt should be considered "untimely" under FRC P 24.
The second case on intervention, Mullinix v. Ci,' of Pontiac,76
involved the question of a citizen's right to intervene under GCR 209
in a suit against the city. Upon the city's adoption of an income tax,
appellant circulated petitions and gleaned enough signatures to
compel a referendum on the issue. When the city commission took
steps to hold the election, another group of citizens sought an
injunction on the ground that appellant's petitions were defective.
The city answered the complaint, admitting that the petitions were
defective. Appellant, whose referendum had been so facilely
cashiered, attempted to intervene and defend the sufficiency of the
petitions. The trial court denied intervention, but the court of
appeals held appellant was entitled to intervention as of right, noting
the otherwise bizarre result that one group of citizens could attack
the petition while its proponents could not defend. The primary
importance of the decision is the effect it should have on
interpretation of GCR 209. As with class actions, the Michigan rule
is practically the same as the pre-1966 federal rule. Under the
unamended rule 24 some federal courts had found themselves in a
conundrum when passing on questions of intervention as of right.
One of the criterion for intervention was that "the representation of
the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate
and the applicant may be bound by a judgment .... .7 Since a
party could not be bound by res judicata unless adequately
represented7 8 some courts denied intervention because the intervenor
must either be adequately represented or not "bound.1 79 To avoid
the use of res judicata as the touchstone for intervention as of right,
the federal rule was amended in 1966, and, among other things, the
phrase "may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect" his interest was substituted for the word "bound."
Although the Michigan rule does not contain the federal
amendment, Mullinix adopted the new federal rule as the standard
by which the present Michigan rule is to be interpreted. Thus, an
attorney with a Michigan intervention problem should consider
76. 16 Mich. App. 110, 167 N.W.2d 856 (1969).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a)(2), 308 U.S. 28, 29 (1938).
78. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
79. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
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GCR 209 as if amended to read like FRCP 24, and federal cases
interpreting the new rule should be persuasive authority in arguing
the problem. Of course, rather than proceeding by such indirection
GCR 209 should be amended to read as FRCP 24.
In Northview Construction Co. v. City of St. Clair Shores,'"
plaintiffs brought a class action to recover fees paid for building
permits under an ordinance later declared invalid. The case is only
noteworthy for the following aside by the court:
The allegations of plaintiffs' complaint are sufficient to
constitute it a class action under [GCR 208.1(3)], but the record does
not contain proof of service of adequate notice on the members of the
class, and no binding relief for or against members of the class can
possibly be granted on the present record Jnor can a determination be
made of the adequacy of the representation 8'
The remark is curious because notice, although authorized under
GCR 208.4, is not required as the court seems to intimate. With
respect to the binding effect of any possible judgment, the court does
not discuss the fact that the class action is of the spurious variety
which traditionally is binding only on named parties. By speaking
as if the judgment would be binding after notice, the court seems to
sub silentio equate GCR 208.1(3) with present FRCP 23(b)(3) which
does require notice and binds everyone within the class who does not
opt out. 2
When the court says that no binding relief for the class can be
granted, it must be rejecting by implication the possibility of one-
way intervention even though the Michigan rule is identical with the
old federal rule under which intervention after judgment had been
permitted. This case is too cryptic to read much into, but it is not
80. 12 Mich. App. 104, 162 N.W.2d 297 (1968).
81. Id. at 106, 162 N.W.2d at 298.
82. See text and the following discussion at note 73 supra. It might be possible that a
"spurious" class action can be convereted into a "true" one by serving notice and an order
to show cause why they should not be bound on the absent members. Cf. United States v.
American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. III. 1951); 76 HARV. L. REV. 1675, 1678-79
(1963). To juxtapose some of the confusion surrounding whether notice is constitutionally
compelled, compare Steelman v. City of Portage, 12 Mich. App. 334, 162 N.W.2d 837 (1968)
(notice preferred but not required in GCR 208.1(1) action), with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[W]e hold that notice is required in all representative
actions" under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.).
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the first time that Michigan courts have failed to distinguish between
class actions that bind all and those that do not.8
VII. RES JUDICATA, BAR, MERGER, JOINDER
Chunko v. LeMaitre' involved the common pattern of auto
accident litigation in which the plaintiff's car carried collision
insurance. The insurance company settled with its insured for the
damages to the insured's car and then proceeded in a common pleas
court action as the subrogee of the insured at the same time the
insured pursued his personal injury claim in circuit court. The
common pleas action came to judgment for the defendant first; the
defendant in the circuit court action then pleaded this judgment as
res judicata.
A number of approaches could be taken to this situation. Those
favoring bar or merger argue that the subrogee is in privity with
the defendant or that the plaintiff has "split" his cause of action by
making the partial assignment05 Those not favoring bar or merger
argue that judgments of inferior courts are not res judicata;6
that the cause of action is not split because the primary rights
invaded are different, either because they are different in nature 7 or
because the real parties in interest are not identical;88 or that, even
though split, the defendant must make timely objection in order that
steps such as joinder might be taken to both protect the defendant
from multiple litigation and the insured from the rigors of res
83. See Theisen v. City of Dearborn, 5 Mich. App. 607, 147 N.W.2d 720 (1967)
(holding all members of a spurious class bound by a prior adjudication), discussed in
Lombard, Civil Procedure, 1967 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 104
(1967).
84. 10 Mich. App. 490, 159 N.W.2d 876 (1968).
85. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478, 243 A.2d 425 (1968), criticized in 37
U.M.K.C.L. REv. 408 (1969). Spinelli does represent the majority view.
86. See text at note 113 infra.
87. Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902); Bronsden
v. Humphrey, 14 Q.B. 141 (1884); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1002 (1958).
88. A somewhat comparable problem has arisen under the Michigan Workman's
Compensation Act, MICH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 413.15 (1967), under which the employer or
insurer is subrogated to the extent of payments made to the rights of the employee against a
third party causing. an injury. The federal courts in Michigan have disagreed as to whether
the insurer must be joined in these cases. Cases requiring joinder are Smallwood v. Days
Transfer, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mich. 1958); Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164
F. Supp. 6-92.(W.D. Mich. 1957). A case not requiring joinder is Shumate v. \Vahlers, 19
F.R.D. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1956). See I MICH. CT. R. ANN. 205, Advisory Committee's Note
at 95 (Supp. 1969), where the authors argue that joinder should not be required.
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judicata when his insurance company loses its litigation. There was
clear precedent in Michigan that separate suits would constitute
splitting a cause of action,"9 so the court adopted the last approach
and held that the judgment was not a bar since the defendant had
not objected to the failure to join the plaintiff in the common pleas
suit.
Since the right to be free from multiple suits is primarily a
benefit to the defendant, it is only reasonable that he timely demand
joinder or waive his right to object. This is the scheme of GCR 201.2
and 205, as explained in the lengthy Committee Comments dealing
with joinder of insured and insurer.90 The same result should obtain
in Detroit Common Pleas Court under common pleas rule 39, which
adopts the GCR to fill hiatuses in the common pleas rules."
It would not be out of place to treat partial assignments or
subrogation in automobile accident cases as sui generis. The court
hints at this approach when it says that barring thie second suit
"would be contrary to the logic and reality of automobile accident
subrogation law .... -92 Although there are exceptions, automobile
insurance is practically mandatory today, and most suits are
defended by an insurance company. Whenever the claim for damage
to the car is assigned, it will be to the insurance company carrying
the collision insurance. Since the adversaries are really insurance
companies and both. no doubt write the same kind of insurance,
take the same kind of assignments, and prosecute the same kind
of suits, there is hardly any equity in the defendant insurance com-
pany worth protecting. Indeed, as an institutional litigator it would
probably be unwise for the defendant insurance company to object
to splitting the cause of action since the plaintiff company would
reciprocate in kind when their roles were reversed in a subsequent
case, thus precluding either from taking advantage of the expedited
common plea court proceeding.
Another road to the same conclusion would be to analogize the
automobile covered with collision insurance to an automobile owned
89. Jones v. Chambers, 353 Mich. 674,91 N.W.2d 889 (1958).
90. I MICH. CT. R. ANN. 205, Advisory Committee's Note at 544 (1963).
91. DET. C.P. CT. R. 30, in HONIGMAN & HAWKINS. MICH. CT. R. MANUAL 604
(1969). See Publishers Agency, Inc. v. Brooks, 14 Mich. App. 634, 166 N.W.2d 26 (1968).
Compare Parson v. Cadillac Outfitting Furniture Co., I I Mich. App. 472, 161 N.W.2d 401
(1968).
92. 10 Mich. App. at 496. 159 N.W.2d at 880.
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by one person and driven by another. In such cases the car owner
can prosecute his suit independent of the driver's suit for personal
injuries. There is no splitting of a cause of action because the
interests of two separate individuals were injured. Since it must bear
the loss of the damage to the car, the insurance company in a very
real sense has an interest much like that of the non-driver ownerY3
A somewhat related problem was considered in Schuhardt v.
Jensen.4 Prior to the principal action, defendants had sued plaintiff
in common pleas court for rent allegedly due, and plaintiff had
successfully urged the defense that any rent due was offset by interest
owed him on a loan made by him to the defendants. In the second
action, plaintiff sued for the principal amount of the loan, and the
court of appeals held that, since in the prior action the court found
that the loan existed, plaintiff's claim for the principal merged in his
defense and was, therefore, barred. The holding that plaintiff was
attempting to split a cause of action is unfortunate because it makes
no mention of GCR 203.1 and 301.2. These rules provide that
"failure by motion or at the pretrial conference to object .. .to a
failure to join claims required to be joined constitutes a waiver of
the required joinder rules and the judgment shall not merge more
than the claims actually litigated." Although the phrase "claims
actually litigated" is somewhat ambiguous, it was the clear intent
of these rules to ameliorate the harsh results of the doctrine of
merger unless the defendant made timely objection; thus, unless the
plaintiff in the prior action objected to the defendants' failure to sue
for both principal and interest, the claim should not have been
considered merged. These rules do not change the collateral estoppel
93. A few courts have made such an exception for subrogated insurers. See Traveler
Indem. Co. v. Moore. 304 Ky. 456. 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947) Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss.
600, 11 So. 584 (1927); Underwriters at Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg Traction Co.. 106
Miss. 244, 63 So. 455 (1913); General Exch. Ins. itorp. v. Young, 357 Mo. 1099. 212 S.W.2d
396 (1948); Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100. 147 S.E. 686 (1929); Hoosier Cas. Co. v.
Davis, 172 Ohio St. 5, 173 N.E.2d 349 (1961); Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61
N.E.2d 707 (1954); 14 FLA. L. REv. 206 (1961).
In Borde v. Hake, 44 Wis. 2d 22, 170 N.W.2d 768 (1969). where the insured sought
recovery for personal injuries, the deductible on the collision insurance, and rental car
expenses, the collision carrier was a necessary party only with respect to the latter two claims.
Upon proper motion, the court said. -'[only that portion of the complaint relating to property
damage which required the joinder of the subrogated insurance company as a necessary party
ought to have been abated. The right of action for personal injuries was unaffected by this
defect in a separate right of action." Id. at -, 170 N.W.2d at 771.
94. II Mich. App. 19, 160 N.W.2d 590 (1968).
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effect of factual issues actually litigated in the prior proceeding. 5
Since the Schuhardt court found that the existence of the loan was
a finding essential to the decision of the common pleas court in the
prior action, the proper result, assuming that actions in common
pleas court should be accorded res judicata in subsequent actions
beyond its jurisdiction, should have been summary judgment for the
plaintiff on the issue of the existence of the loan.
In Mackris v. Murray,6 the Sixth Circuit examined the extent
to which Michigan still requires mutuality before a non-party or one
not in privity with a party can use a prior adjudication as collateral
estoppel. The situation was again a familiar one: the owner of an
automobile had successfully concluded a common pleas court suit
for damages to his automobile, and the non-owner driver attempted
to establish this judgment as res judicata on the issue of the
defendant's negligence in his separate suit for personal injuries. The
court held that lack of mutuality precluded such use of the prior
judgment. It would seem the case was correctly decided both from
the point of view of assessing the present state of Michigan law and
from the point of view of good policy. Many of the reasons the court
gives for the result, however, simply do not stand up in the context
of this fact situation.
The court relied on the common classroom example of the mass
tort-the train wreck, plane wreck, bus wreck, or ship wreck. If the
carrier successfully defended the first ten cases but lost the eleventh,
it seems anomalous and unjust to hold the defendant liable in all
succeeding cases on the basis of one adverse verdict when the carrier
would not be permitted to take advantage (other than by way of
experience) of the first ten victories.17 But such an anomaly is not
95. See I MICH. GEN. CT. R. 203.1, Advisory Committee's Note at 473 (1963).
96. 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968).
97. Such an anomaly, did not bother the New York Supreme Court in Hart v. American
Airlines, Inc., - Misc. _., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1969). An American Airlines
aircraft crashed in Kentucky, and the first case arising therefrom to be brought to a conclusion
was won by the plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. The Hart court held that representatives of New York domiciled decedents (but not
decedents domiciled elsewhere) could plead the Texas judgment as res judicata in New York
actions, even though Texas would have applied the doctrine of mutuality to its own judgment.
Aside from the doctrine of mutuality, the decision raises problems of choice of law, due
process. full faith and credit, and privileges and immunities.
The Hart decision comes at the end of a long line of New York Court of Appeals
decisions which have eroded the doctrine of mutuality to such an extent that the doctrine is
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possible in the present situation where there can be no more than two
plaintiffs Y
The court also argues that permitting collateral estoppel would 8
mean that the defendant would be induced to litigate the first case
to the utmost when otherwise (although he would not settle) he
would do a poorer job or let the case go by default. This result, the
court states, is counter to the policy of minimizing litigation. This
argument is questionable. It seems far more likely that the multiple,
fully litigated suits resulting from failure to give collateral estoppel
effect to the first suit will consume more judicial time and energy
than would the one well-litigated suit. The court adds its own
observation as to a bizarre consequence of collateral estoppel with
the example of the defendant who takes a fifty dollar law suit
casually and defends sloppily by hiring his nephew, new to the bar,
as counsel. Of course, it seems unfair to hold that defendant has
foregone his defense of non-negligence in a subsequent $100,000 law
suit for his passenger's wrongful death if the issue was not properly
tried in the fender-bender suit. The argument, though, is circular.
The only reason the first suit was taken so casually was that it would
considered a "dead letter" in New York. See, e.g.. Schwartz v. Public Admin., 24 N.Y.2d
65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1969); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d
141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1967), Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d
976, 218 N.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1966); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y.2d 18 N.Y.2d 105.
271 N.Y.S.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d I, 134 N.E.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1956); Good Health Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1937).
98. The various possible permutations and combinations are explored and analyzed in
Currie, Mutualit" of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine. 9 STA\. L. Ri v.
281, 310-11 (1957). Professor Currie reasoned that abandonment of the mutuality requirement
was sound except "where the result would be to create an anomaly such as would occur in
the railroad type of situation, where the party against whom the plea is asserted faces more
than two successive actions." or where "by reason of his former adversary's possession of
the initiative" he has not "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue effectively."
This approach was approved in Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964)
(defendant who lost in suit by five employees for breach of contract held bound in subsequent
class action brought by approximately 160 other employees). See also Maryland ex rel,
Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967); United States v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962).
Professor Currie's assertion that the mass accident anomaly does not arise when there
are only two possible plaintiffs is criticized by Greenebaum, In Dejense o! the Doctrine of
Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J I, 13 (1969).
For some further discussion of the problem of mutuality, see Currie. Civil Procedure: The
Tempest Brews. 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Elects ol Prior
Litigation, 39 IowA L. R~v. 217 (1954): Note. The Impacts of Delensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a NonpartY. 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010 (1967) 52
CORN LL L.Q. 724 (1967); 57 HARV. L. Riv. 98 (1943).
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not be collateral estoppel in a second suit if the defendant lost. If
the rule were otherwise and the potential claimants apparent, the
first case would be tried fully and completely.
The better reason for denying collateral estoppel effect to a
judgment against a defendant when there are no more than two
plaintiffs is that the quality of adjudication is not likely to be as good
in the first case as in the second because (a) the court, if a lower
one, is less competent to decide the case,(b) the plaintiff had a
strategic advantage in picking the time and place of suit, (c) the fact-
finder may not give the suit its deserved attention because unaware
of the extensive consequences of its findings, or (d) the plaintiffs can
bring their most appealing case first in hopes of inducing a
compromise verdict.
The Mackris court distinguished each case put before it that did
not require mutuality on the basis that collateral estoppel was urged
defensively by a non-party to the prior suit. That the plea was raised
defensively is not, in and of itself, a valid distinction since a defensive
plea can result in the same unfairness and anomaly as can an
offensive pleaY As an example, assume plaintiff successfully sues ten
defendants but loses the eleventh case because found to be
contributorily negligent. If there is a distinction between this case
and the affirmative use of an adverse judgment against a defendant,
it must be that the plaintiff controls the action and is responsible in
the first instance for the piece-meal pursuit of the litigation. The
leading case. Bernhard v. Bank oJ America National Trust & Savings
Association,'" holding that a plaintiff should be barred by such an
adverse holding, has been stated as the law of Michigan by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals ' " but has not yet been expressly adopted
by the Michigan Supreme Court. Clark v. NaufeP"2 clearly stands
for the proposition that a non-party to a prior proceeding
subsequently sued by the defendant may not use defensively the fact
that the defendant was found negligent in the prior proceeding. In
the later case of Depolo v. Grieg,"'' the Michigan Supreme Court
allowed an agent to use defensively a finding in a prior suit against
99. See Cook v. Kendrick. 16 Mich. App. 110. 167 N.W.2d 856 (1961). where defensive
uwe by an exonerated defendant was not permitted.
100. 19 Cal. 2d 807. 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
101. Davis v. McKinnon. 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1959).
102. 328 Mich. 249. 43 N.W.2d 839 (1950).
103. 338 Mich. 703. 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954).
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the principal that the agent was not liable even though a finding that
the principal was liable would not have bound the agent unless a
party. The court expressly reasoned that, since a principal is
exonerated if a plaintiff loses a suit against the agent, the converse
should also follow. The converse, however, does not follow. The
reason for dispensing with mutuality in the first situation is to avoid
the anomaly of either forcing the principal to forego his right of
indemnification against the agent without having been a party to the
first proceeding or preserving his right of indemnity even though the
agent has successfully defended himself. In the converse situation to
exonerate the principal and still allow the agent to be found negligent
is no more anomalous than the inconsistent judgments which the rule
of mutuality fosters. 04 Thus, if there is a distinction between Clark
and Depolo, it must be that in Clark the judgment was being used
against a prior defendant, while in Depolo it was being used
defensively against a prior plaintiff who, because he controlled the
litigation, should not be permitted to complain.10' Even this is a
tenuous distinction in the context of Depolo because Depolo did not
have any choice of time, place, or forum in the prior action since it
consisted of the filing and disallowance of his claim in bankruptcy
proceedings already instituted. Thus, if the true basis for Depolo be
known, it probably goes as far or further than Bernhard.10 5'1
104. But see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96(2), Illustration 9 (1942).
105. It has been suggested that the doctrine of mutuality should not apply when the first
suit exonerates the master, and the second suit seeks recovery against the agent because
separate suits may be unduly harassing to the agent, who certainly would have been involved
at least as a witness in the first suit against the master based on his alleged misconduct. See
Greenebaum, supra note 98, at 6. If this were the true basis of the Depolo decision, then it
would be strong authority for allowing the driver in Mackris v. Murray to rely on the prior
victory of the car owner, since most likely the driver was intimately involved in the prior suit.
105.1. On February 9, 1970, the Michigan Court of Appeals released for publication
Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., Mich. App. -_, 173 N.W.2d 777 (1969).
Although this case came down too late to be treated at length in this Survey, if sustained by
the supreme court it will work a substantial revision in Michigan's approach to mutuality.
Note particularly the following language:
Collateral estoppel is essentially a procedural tool designed to conserve judicial
resources and to insure consistent decisions on the same issues and facts.
In our view the application of estoppel is best left to the discretion of the trial
judge, who guided by "broad principles of justice," would weigh the interests of the
litigants and the efficient administration of justice.
We hold that he [the trial judge] was free to do so [to preclude a defendent from
[Vol. 16
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Following the pattern of a common pleas court adjudication
preceeding an action in the circuit court, Cook v. KendrickI0 6
grappled with another knotty problem of res judicata. The owner of
a parked car filed a common pleas court action to recover for
damages done to his automobile in a collision between the two
defendants. Each defendant contended that the responsibility for the
accident was the other's. The judgment went against one defendant
who subsequently was the plaintiff in a circuit court action against
the other defendant. The defendant in the circuit court action
attempted to plead the common pleas judgment as res judicata on
the issue of plaintiff's negligence. The court held that decisions of
lower courts in Michigan can be res judicata in the higher courts,
thus presenting the issue whether defendants in the common pleas
court action were adverse parties such that the judgment would be
res judicata in any other action between them. Both the trial and
appellate courts concluded that, since no cross-claim had been filed
between them, the common pleas action only adjudicated the rights
of the plaintiff against the defendants, and not the rights of the
defendants between themselves.
While the question is novel in Michigan and the law in other
jurisdictions is hardly settled on the subject, one author has found a
growing trend to hold that in such a situation the judgment should
be considered res judicata between the co-defendants."'7 In fact, the
New York Court of Appeals recently held for the first time that
collateral estoppel should apply in the subsequent suit between the
relitigating the question of negligence in a suit by a subsequent plaintiff] or not as in
his discretion the ends ofjustice require.
Id. at 779-80. Presumably the considerations the trial judge should ponder in exercising his
discretion would be those enumerated by the New York Court of Appeals and set out in note
108 supra. The Howell decision, however, sets no parameters and leaves the trial court to
exercise its discretion in a state of conscious anomy.
106. 16 Mich. App. 110, 167 N.W.2d 856 (1969).
107. F. JAMES. CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.25, at 589 (1965). If there was a trend,
examination of the most recent collection of cases indicates it has not gone very far. Those
jurisdictions that do not apply collateral estoppel still greatly outnumber those that do.
Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 318, 360-71 (1969).
For other considerations of the problem, see Ordway v. White, 14 App. Div. 498, 217
N.Y.S.2d 334 (1961) (opinion of Halpern, J.); 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158. 1169-70 (1961); 1961
DUKE L.J. 167, criticizing Park v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118 (1960). which
applied collateral estoppel even though the former action was terminated by a consent
judgment and under North Carolina procedure no opportunity to file cross-claims was
available to the litigants.
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co-defendants.'"' Had the judgment gone against both defendants,
there would have been a right of contribution between them
regardless of the lack of a cross-claim.' Furthermore, all parties
were in court and had an opportunity to present their evidence.
Although there may be some problems with respect to cross-
examination,"" admissions, and the use of depositions,"' a rule that
the judgment would be res judicata should adequately dispose of any
argument that the co-defendants are not "opposite,"' tt2 "adverse,"
108. Schwartz v. Public Admin., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (Ct.
App. 1969). To quote the court, the Schwartz case involved the question:
Should a judgment in favor of a passenger in an action against the operators of two
colliding vehicles give rise to an estoppel, which would bar a subsequent action by one
of the drivers against the other for his own personal injuries or property damage'?
24 N.Y.2d at 69, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 958, 246 N.E.2d at 727. The court answered the question
"yes" so long as the issue was the same and the drivers had a full and fair opportunity in the
prior action to establish their non-negligence. The court listed the following factors as bearing
on whether the drivers had a full and fair hearing in the prior action:
[T]he size of the claim, the forum of the prior litigation, the use of initiative, the extent
of the litigation, the competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new
evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in the applicable law and
foreseeability of future lititigation.
24 N.Y.2d at 72, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961, 246 N.E.2d at 729.
Although the Schwartz case involved a suit by a passenger against the drivers, and the
Cook case involved a suit by a bystander against the drivers, the difference is immaterial. The
Schwartz case is criticized in Greenebaum, supra note 98, at 15.
109. RJA § 2925(t)(1961) provides:
Whenever a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defendants
in an action for bodily injury or death resulting therefrom, or property damage. and
such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such defendants, each
defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share is entitled to contribution
with respect to the excess so paid over and above the pro rata share of the defendant
or defendants making such payment. Joint tortfeasors who are summoned in as third
party defendants pursuant to court rule may likewise be liable for contribution. No
person may be compelled to pay to any other defendant an amount greater than his
pro rata share of the entire judgment.
110. See Rice v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Ohio App. 2d 15, 179 N.E.2d 139 (1961); Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1955).
IIl. 4 J. MooR-. FFDI-RAI PRACTICE I 26.29, at 1653-54 (2d ed. 1961).
112. RJA § 2161 (1961)provides:
In any suit or proceeding in any court in this state, either party. if he shall call as a
witness in his behalf, the opposite party, employee or agent of said opposite party. or
any person who at the time of the happening of the transaction out of which such suit
or proceeding grew, was an employee or agent of the opposite party, shall have the right
to cross-examine such witness the same as if he were called by the opposite party . . ..
MicH. GLx. CT. R. 507.4 (1963) provides:
Parties or persons who were their employees or agents at the time of the happening of
[Vol. 16
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or "hostile." Even though the defendants would be ad idem in their
opposition to the plaintiff on damage questions, they are the real
adversaries on the question of negligence. Since the plaintiff had the
initiative in bringing the action he might have enjoyed an advantage,
but there is no reason to assume that one defendant had an
advantage over the other.
There are several contrary arguments that might be advanced
against this position. One argument is that the judgment was that
of a lower court, and to give it res judicata effect in a suit beyond
that court's competence would both frustrate the policy underlying
the restrictions on that court's jurisdiction and burden the parties
with a result far beyond their expectations . 13 Since the procedure in
these lower courts is more streamlined, and the right to jury trial is
significantly curtailed, the first point as to competence is a good
one."' It was, however, rejected by the court"5 and has been rejected
by a majority of jurisdictions. The second point is circular, since the
expectations of the parties are a function of the res judicata rule
adopted. Another argument is that since cross-claims are
discretionary, not compulsory, to give res judicata effect regardless
of whether such a claim was brought would frustrate the policy
making such claims discretionary."6 But, if there is any strong policy
underlying GCR 203.3, it is that cross-claims should be available.By
making such a procedural device available, it was clearly the hope
to encourage its use, which the rule of res judicata certainly
does." 7 It is doubtful whether there is any strong policy discouraging
the use of cross-claims. '" Indeed, that joinder of transactionally
related claims is permissive unless objected to by the opposite party,
the transaction out of which the action arose, when called as witnesses by the opposite
party. may be cross-examined by the party calling them and the testimony given by
such persons may be contradicted and impeached.
113. See Annot.. 83 A.L.R.2d 977. 996 (1962).
114. F. JANIES. CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.35. at 604-05 (1965).
115. The case on which the court relied is not very strong. See Andreas v. School Dist..
138 Mich. 54. 100 N.W. 1021 (1904).
116. Lowery v. Muse. 151 A.2d 263. 265 (D.C. Mun. App. 1959). see Bunge v. Yager,
236 Minn. 245. 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952). See also 1961 DuKI- L.J. 167. 169 n.9:34 B.U.L. Ri-v.
104 (1954).
117. In Semmel. Collateral Estoppel. Mutualityr and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUNI. L.
REv. 1475. 1571 (1968). the author argues that the doctrine of res judicata should be
administered in such a manner as to encourage the resolution through joinder of parties of
all claims growing out of the same transaction.
118. F, JAMLs. CIVIL PROCI-DtRI- § 11.24, at 586-87 (1965).
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and that joinder of non-transactionally related claims is completely
permissive has not barred application of res judicata when the
adjudicated facts are the same in successive cases between the same
parties. Furthermore, one might look at the Contribution Between
Joint Tortfeasors Act"' as raising a cross-claim as a matter of law
since no cross-claim need be filed for one defendant to take
advantage of the provisions for contribution when a joint judgment
is rendered. If the plaintiff had sued only one defendant in the
common pleas court, that defendant could have applied under GCR
204.1(1) for leave as a third-party plaintiff to implead the other
defendant. In such a case there would have been pleading between
them such that they could be considered adverse or opposite parties.
Where the plaintiff chooses to sue both defendants, the situation
between the defendants is substantially identical with that where a
third-party complaint for contribution has been filed' 2
Since holding the findings in Cook to be res judicata would
encourage the filing of cross-claims which would require removal of
the case to the circuit court, it might be argued that it would
frustrate the policy of affording plaintiffs with relatively small
claims a forum for the economic and expeditious adjudication which
underlies the creation of the common pleas court. But, when there
are potential multiple claims, the efficiency of the courts is also at
stake, and it is not unreasonable to subordinate the plaintiff's
interest when a contrary rule would result in double adjudication of
essentially the same questions between the same parties. The
availability of cross-claims and impleader belies any contention that
the original plaintiff has a "right" to try his suit free from becoming
embroiled in the disputes of others.
Two final arguments, the first raised by counsel but not relied
on by the court and the second raised by other courts facing similar
119. RJA § 2925 (1961).
120. Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952), is a leading case in which
the court held that, even though a prior adjudication would be res judicata between co-
defendants in a subsequent action for contribution, the prior action would not be res judicata
in an action between the former co-defendants to recover for their injuries. The rationale was
that the right to contribution depends on the joint liability of the defendants which was finally
determined in the first trial while the rights of the defendants inter se with respect to their
own injuries was not determined since they were not adversaries in the original action. The
court does, however, admit that a contrary argument is plausible. What the court's argument
ignores is the fact that the joint liability in these fact situations necessarily turns on the active
negligence of both parties.
[Vol. 16
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questions, are that identity of issues is lacking either (1) because the
negligence that caused the parked car to be struck was not also the
cause of the collision, or (2) because the defense of last clear chance
would be available in the second action but not in the first.'2' Of
course the latter argument is relevant only when both defendants
were found liable in the first proceeding, and even then under
Michigan's peculiar formulation of the rule it may be that the
defense would be available in a suit by a bystander. 22 If not
available, the objection still only goes to the scope of res judicata,
and the second suit could proceed on the premise that both parties
were negligent, and only the question of last clear chance would be
litigated. The first argument is more difficult and would turn on
what was actually adjudicated in the first proceeding. An example
where the negligence might be different would be that of a carefully
proceeding driver who, when faced with the sudden emergency of an
inevitable collision with a negligently driven oncoming car,
nevertheless makes an unreasonable choice under all the
circumstances and steers into plaintiff's parked car. If the case
presented such a possibility, it would be proper to deny res judicata
effect to the judgment because it could not be said in the subsequent
action that the negligence of the driver vis-a-vis the other driver was
necessarily decided by the judgment. This inquiry, though difficult,
is no more foreign than that necessary when applying collateral
estoppel in situations where the doctrines of bar or merger are not
available to foreclose relitigation of all- questions that were or might
have been litigated between the parties.
VIII. APPEAL
By amendment to GCR 806 the supreme court made "final
orders" appealable as of right' 2 3 The two words have had an
121. See. e.g.. Creighton v. Ruark, 230 Md. 145, 186 A.2d 208 (1962).
122. In LaCroix v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 379 Mich. 417. 423, 152 N.W.2d 656, 658
(1967). the court said:
Such gross negligence is also sometimes called discovered negligence, wanton or wilful
or reckless negligence, discovered peril, last clear chance doctrine, and the humanitarian
rule ..
The theory of gross negligence is that the antecedent negligence of plaintiff only
put him in a position of danger and was therefore only the remote cause of the injury,
while the subsequently intervening negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause.
If the doctrine is based on the theory that only one of the two negligent defendants caused
the collision, then it would seem to follow that only the grossly negligent defendant caused
the injury to the third party.
123. 381 Mich. lviii-lx (1969).
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indecisive history in the GCR. They were included in the original
rule 806 but not in the new rule 806, effective on January 1, 1965,
and now by amendment they have been reinserted into the present
rule. Unfortunately, "final order," is a term of great imprecision,
and defining similar terms in the federal courts has proved a
ubiquitous and perennial problem . 24 The quandry in which a litigant
finds himself results from the very strict time limits placed on
appeals as of right. GCR 806 provides that appeals as of right must
be taken within the prescribed time limits, and GCR 803 provides
that the time limits there set forth are jurisdictional for appeals as
of right. The result is that if a litigant fails to properly diagnose an
erroneous ruling as a "final order" and lets the appeal period pass
he is foreclosed from review as of right."' This situation creates a
substantial incentive to immediately appeal when in doubt as to the
finality of an erroneous order. The result, of course, is interruption
of the orderly disposition of trials, an increased burden on appellate
courts, and much time wasted on the issue whether to hear a case
rather than proceeding to the merits. Since considerable ink has been
spilled on this and similar problems by others,' the only purpose
here is to alert the bar to the amendment.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964) limits Supreme Court review of state court decisions on
appeal or certiorari to "[fainal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had. ... 28 id. § 1291 provides that "Itlhe courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts .... "
"'Probably no question of equity practice has been the subject of more frequent discussion
in this court than the finality of decrees." McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S.
536, 544-45 (1892) (dictum). See, e.g.. Bartke, "Finalit"' Four Years Later-Sonte
Reflections and Recommendations, 19 BAYLOR L. REv. 350 (1967): Dyk. Supreme Court
Review of Interlocutory State-Court Decisions: "'The Tilight Zone of Finalit.'." 19 STAN,
L. REv. 907 (1967); Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TE\AS L. R- v. 292
(1966).
Existing Michigan authority is of scant assistance. See Tomkiw v. Sauceda. 374 Mich.
381, 385. 132 N.W.2d 125, 127 (1965) (semble) (order appealed from pre-dated GCR 1963):
Equitable Trust Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.. 263 Mich. 394. 256 N.W.2d 460 (1934). Compare
Standard Bldg. Prod..Co. v. Woodland Bldg. Co., I Mich. App. 434. 136 N.W.2d 744 (1965)
(Order granting partial summary judgment for $3.521 unappealable as of right. Unclear
whether GCR 806 was applied as it stood before or after Jan. 1, 1965), iiith Donellon v.
County of Wayne. 2 Mich. App. 576, 141 N.W.2d 387 (1966) (applying GCR 806 prior to
1965, held summary judgment for one of multiple defendants was appealable as of right.
therefore must be timely).
125. Donellon v. County of Wayne. 2 Mich. App. 576. 141 N.W.2d 387 (1966). we
Tomkiw v. Sauceda, 374 Mich. 381, 385. 132 N.W.2d 125, 127 (1965).
126. See periodicals cited note 124 supra.
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